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E-Mail Service in New York State
Anastazia Sienty
Dedicated to Genoveffa Flagello for your help, Glenn Carroll for
waiting up, and Meroslaw Sienty for laughing.
An Overview
“Fwd: > > > Fwd: > > > Fwd: > > > RE: LAWSUIT ! ! < < < < ”
When you hear about service by e-mail, what do you think?
“It looks like junk mail.” “I haven’t check my e-mail in weeks.”
“I’ll delete it and pretend I didn’t get it.” “I don’t understand,
this can’t be a real thing.”
There are over 2.5 billion e-mail users in the world.1 What
was once a novel personal method of communication has
become a preferred method of business communication. E-mail
is entrusted with business contracts, airline tickets, medical
records, bank statements, mortgage documents, and is
increasingly relied upon by New York courts. C.P.L.R. § 308
instructs how to serve process in New York State. Although it
does not expressly include service by e-mail, case law is
evolving so that service via e-mail is increasingly accepted by
New York courts.
This article will review New York’s service statute,
C.P.L.R. § 308, in light of today’s culture and communications.
Part One reviews the Constitutional framework of service, the
statutory demands for e-mail as a method of service with
appropriate leave of court, and provides an overview of the
statute. Part Two reviews the evolution of New York case law.
Part Three focuses on “how to” use C.P.L.R. § 308(5) to obtain
service of process by e-mail. Part Four contemplates the future
of service via e-mail.

1. THE RADICATI GRP., INC., E-MAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2015-2019 1, 3
(2015), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/EmailStatistics-Report-2015-2019-Executive-Summary.pdf.
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Today, people are more mobile than ever. Over 4.1 billion
e-mail accounts exist worldwide.2 E-mail has become an
integral part of communication between people, encouraged by
its necessary partnership with social media, networking sites,
and the desire to maintain a presence on the Internet.3 For
many people, e-mail is a primary form of communication.
Would it really be unfair to allow its use for the purposes of
formally notifying someone that they are a defendant in a court
proceeding?
I.

Proper Service Involves Due Process

One of the first cases to permit service via e-mail was a
federal case, Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio International Interlink
where the 9th Circuit found service via e-mail to be reasonably
calculated to “apprise . . . [defendant] . . . of the pendency of the
action and afford it an opportunity to respond.”4 While the
Constitution does not specify any particular method of service,
notice to a defendant is a fundamental requirement of
constitutional due process. 5
“In proper circumstances, this broad constitutional
principle unshackles the federal courts from anachronistic
methods of service and permits them entry into the
technological renaissance.”6 Although communication via email and over the Internet is comparatively new, such

2. THE RADICATI GRP., INC., E-MAIL STATISTICS REPORT, 2014-2018, 1,
2 (2014), http://www.radicati.com/wp/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/EmailStatistics-Report-2014-2018-Executive-Summary.pdf.
3. Id. at 3.
4. Rio Props., Inc. v. Rio Int'l Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1017 (9th Cir.
2002) (Discussing situation in which a hotel and casino operator brought a
trademark infringement action against an international company that
primarily operated through the Internet. The only U.S. address provided by
defendant was that of its courier in Miami, Florida. The business was
designed to operate via the Internet and did not provide any permanent
location. Only e-mail and a website were used for communication.).
5. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950)
(“An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any
proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice reasonably calculated,
under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”).
6. Rio Props., 284 F.3d at 1017.
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communications have been zealously embraced within society
at large and the business community in particular.7
When authorizing service via e-mail, New York courts
require compliance with New York State procedural rules and
constitutional due process. The state’s interest in bringing its
citizens’ issues to final settlement must be balanced against the
individual’s interest in the opportunity to be heard as protected
by the 14th Amendment.8 While there is no specific test for due
process, the United States Supreme Court in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. proclaimed due process
requirements from precedent and required service to be
reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the
action.9 Due process requires that the method chosen for notice
be crafted with the purpose of actually informing the
defendant.10 Service via e-mail may be defended on two
grounds: (i) e-mail is reasonably calculated to provide notice of
the pending action and (ii) e-mail is not substantially less likely
to provide notice than the customary methods of providing
notice.11
A. Service of Process is Calculated to Provide Notice, Not
Jurisdiction
C.P.L.R. § 308 is a notice statute, not a procedural statute.
The statute and case law strive to provide an opportunity to be
heard, and the statute acknowledges that this is only possible if
the defendant is made aware of the action. Under C.P.L.R. §
308(5), the courts mandate outcome, not process. In this way,
the law adapts to society’s changing cultural norms.
B.

The Evolution of Jurisdiction and Communication

7. Id.
8. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313-14.
9. Id. at 314-15 (citations omitted) (“[N]otice [must be] reasonably
calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections. The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the
required information and it must afford a reasonable time for those
interested to make their appearance.”).
10. Id. at 315.
11. Id.
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Marching forward with technological advances, courts
have permitted service through a variety of means. In 1970, a
district court ordered service of process via telex.12 In 2000 a
district court permitted service via facsimile where the
defendant refused to provide a permanent street address and
only provided a permanent e-mail address and fax number.13 A
federal court even ordered service via television where the
plaintiff was required to provide notice to the defendant via
newspaper publication and paid television advertisements.14
Characteristics of the Internet were carefully considered by the
court in Zippo Manufacturing Company v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc.
where the court analyzed personal jurisdiction against the
introduction of the sliding scale of website interactivity.15
C.

The Statutory Framework: Overview of Service of Process

In New York State, C.P.L.R. § 308 governs personal service
of process upon a natural person, which may be made by any of
the following five methods:
1.   “by delivering the summons within the
state to the person . . .; or
2.   “by delivering the summons within the
state to a person of suitable age and
discretion at the actual place of business,
dwelling place, or usual place of abode of
the person to be served . . .; or
3.   “by delivering the summons within the
12. See New Eng. Merch. Nat’l Bank v. Iran Power Generation &
Transmission Co., 495 F. Supp. 73, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Telex, MERRIAMWEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/telex (last visited Oct.
9, 2015) (Telex is a communication system where messages are sent over long
distances using a telephone system and are printed using a machine called a
teletypewriter).
13. In re Int’l Telemedia Assocs., Inc., 245 B.R. 713, 718 (Bankr. N.D.
Ga. 2000).
14. Smith ex rel. Smith v. Islamic Emirate of Afg., 262 F. Supp. 2d 217,
220 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
15. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. Pa.
1997).
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state to an agent for service of the person
to be served as designated under rule 318
. . .; or
4.   “where service under paragraphs one and
two cannot be made with due diligence, by
affixing the summons to the door of either
the actual place of business, dwelling
place, or usual place of abode within the
state of the person to be served . . .”; or
5.   “in such manner as the court, upon
motion without notice, directs, if service
is impracticable under paragraphs one,
two and four of this section.”16
Methods one and three are one-step processes of personal
delivery. Method two is a two-step process of delivery and
mailing (sometimes mailing is to a different address than
where the papers were delivered). Method two is known as
“leave and mail” service. Notice is left at defendant’s last
known residence, usual place of abode, or actual place of
business followed by mailing the summons within 20 days.17
Service is complete ten days after filing.18
Method four is a three-step process which is only
permissible if you fail to accomplish service under methods one
or two. It is commonly referred to as “nail and mail.”19
Method five is the wild card under which the courts may
devise service calculated to give notice to defendant where no
other method of service under C.P.L.R. § 308 is possible.
C.P.L.R. § 308(5) is a notice statute. It does not confer
jurisdiction. It merely asks a party to “[p]resent a basis of
jurisdiction, [and] an expedient order under § 308(5) may be
16. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 (McKinney 2016). For context regarding
C.P.L.R. § 308(3): “A person may be designated by a natural person,
corporation or partnership as an agent for service in a writing . . . .” N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 318 (McKinney 2016).
17. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(2) (McKinney 2016).
18. Id. (“. . . . except in matrimonial actions where service hereunder
may be made pursuant to an order made in accordance with the provisions of
subdivision a of section two hundred thirty-two of the domestic relations law .
. . .”).
19. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(4) (McKinney 2016).
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framed.”20
A handful of recent New York State court decisions have
embraced C.P.L.R. § 308(5) as the accidental hero for the
evolution of a 45 year old service statute.21 When an attorney
is in the unfortunate situation of being unable to effect service
by personal delivery, “leave and mail,” or “nail and mail” then
C.P.L.R.§ 308(5) allows the court, in its own discretion, to
fashion a method of service upon ex parte motion and without
notice,22 provided (i) the serving party must make an ex parte
motion for expedient service,23 (ii) the court must be satisfied
that service is “impracticable” under the specific provisions of
subdivisions 1, 2, and 4, and (iii) the requested alternate
service is reasonably calculated to provide defendant notice of
the action against her.24
II. New York Case Law Accepts Service Via E-mail
Three New York cases analyze the use of C.P.L.R. § 308(5)
to provide notice by e-mail. Hollow v. Hollow discusses the
meaning of “impracticable” before determining that service
under C.P.L.R. § 308(1), (2), and (4) were indeed

20. Arroyo v. Arroyo, 351 N.Y.S.2d 536, 539 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
21. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 (McKinney 2016).
22. Id.
23. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5) is often referred to as both “expedient service”
and “alternative service.” Kelly v. Lewis, 632 N.Y.S.2d 186, 186 (App. Div. 2d
Dept. 1995); Hitchcock v. Pyramid Ctrs. of Empire State Co., 542 N.Y.S.2d
813, 814 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1989); Saulo v. Noumi, 501 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96 (App.
Div. 2d Dept. 1986); Markoff v. S. Nassau Cmty. Hosp., 458 N.Y.S.2d 672,
673 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1983); Liebeskind v. Liebeskind, 449 N.Y.S.2d 226,
228 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1982) (expedient service). Simens v. Sedrish, 440
N.Y.S.2d 687, 688 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1981); Giordano v. McMurtry, 433
N.Y.S.2d 583, 584 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1980); Arroyo, 351 N.Y.S.2d at 539;
Deason v. Deason, 343 N.Y.S.2d 276, 279 (Sup. Ct. 1973); Prince v. Prince,
329 N.Y.S.2d 963, 964 (Sup. Ct. 1972) (alternative service).
24. See Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1968) (Consisting of
three cases consolidated for appeal where plaintiffs sued for recoveries of
personal injuries sustained in automobile accidents. The Court of Appeals
affirmed three ex parte motions which permitted service by ordinary mail to
defendants at their Pennsylvania addresses, service by publication in a
Brooklyn newspaper, and service by mail to defendant's last known address
in conjunction with delivery of copies to the insurance carrier.).

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7
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impracticable.25 Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc, recognized that
e-mail has become a customary form of communication and
may, under certain circumstances, be reasonably calculated to
provide notice of the action to the defendant.26 Alfred E. Mann
Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L. found due process
where the defendant had waived his right to statutory notice in
favor of notice via e-mail.27
A.

Hollow v. Hollow

Hollow v. Hollow, a divorce action, was the first case in
which a New York court was asked to effect personal service
via e-mail.28 Mr. Hollow left his marital home in 1999 and
moved to Saudi Arabia where he lived and worked on a private
company compound. The only contact he had with his wife was
through his e-mail account. Multiple attempts to serve Mr.
Hollow failed due to the secure nature of the property and
because he rarely left the company compound.29
After several failed attempts at service, the plaintiff
motioned the court for leave to serve the defendant via e-mail
under C.P.L.R. § 308(5).30 Per the statute, the court first found
that service under C.P.L.R. § 308(1), (2), and (4) was
impracticable as plaintiff made reasonable efforts under the
circumstances to effect service by employing an international
process server and attempting service through the defendant’s
employer. The process server hired by the plaintiff submitted
an affidavit describing his various attempts to serve the
defendant. Effecting legal service in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia was unworkable as it required government intervention
and could take twelve to eighteen months to complete. Since
the husband rarely left the company compound, in-hand service
was virtually impossible. Serving a member of the security
staff could result in the process server being arrested since the
25. Hollow v. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (Sup. Ct. 2002).
26. Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442 (Civ. Ct. 2008).
27. Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L., 910
N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2010).
28. Hollow, 747 N.Y.S.2d at 705.
29. Id. at 704.
30. Id. at 705.
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defendant’s employer refused to accept service on his behalf.31
After finding statutorily authorized service to be
impracticable, the court next analyzed the Internet’s place in
daily life and determined that while the question of serving
notice via e-mail is one of first impression, the effect of
emerging technologies is recognized by New York’s common
law.32
Satisfied that common law will accommodate changing
technology, the court next reviewed cases that approved service
via e-mail within federal law or other states’ laws. The New
York court found that under appropriate circumstances, service
via e-mail can meet the constitutional due process requirement
of being reasonably calculated to provide notice and an
opportunity to respond.33
Ultimately, the court found that Mr. Hollow had made
statutory service impracticable when he “secreted himself
behind a steel door, bolted shut, communicating with the
plaintiff and his children exclusively through e-mail.”34 While
the court was concerned with the difficulty of verifying Mr.
Hollow’s receipt of an e-mail message, a “constitutionally
proper method of effecting substituted service need not
guarantee that in all cases the defendant will in fact receive
actual notice.”35 The court ordered service to Mr. Hollow’s last
known e-mail address coupled with service by international
registered air mail and international standard mail.36
The court was right to find that service was impracticable
under these circumstances. The plaintiff had attempted service
at every known address, she made a legitimate and meaningful
effort to locate the defendant, and access to the defendant’s
residence was physically impossible. By choosing only to
correspond with his wife and children via e-mail, the defendant
showed that this particular e-mail address belonged to him,
was used regularly, and that he received messages through this
31. Id.
32. Id. at 707.
33. Id. (discussing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S.
306, 314 (1950)).
34. Id. at 708.
35. Id.
36. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7
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e-mail address. If the husband can communicate out from this
address, then the wife can communicate in.
B.

Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc.

While the facts of Hollow v. Hollow are unique, the facts of
Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc. are more routine. Snyder
involved a breach of contract for services performed and
expenses incurred by the plaintiff. Snyder analyzed the
practicality of e-mail communications in daily life. The court
permitted Snyder to serve Energy Inc. and its president, Peter
Nelson, via e-mail as part of a customized plan for alternate
service devised by the court.37 In Snyder the plaintiff submitted
affirmations from attorneys, process servers, and the plaintiff
to establish the impracticability of personal or mailed service
on Energy Inc. and Peter Nelson.38 The plaintiff demonstrated
that despite a rigorous search (which included subpoenaing a
telephone service, utilizing people locators, and searching court
dockets) it was unable to locate a valid home or business
address for either defendant.39 The defendants had abandoned
their New York and Connecticut addresses leaving no
forwarding information.40
Defendant Peter Nelson’s physical location could not be
established, but the plaintiff did communicate with Mr. Nelson
on a handful of occasions through AOL instant messenger and
e-mail. In demonstrating to the court its efforts to locate the
defendants, the plaintiff showed that Mr. Nelson maintained a
regular on-line presence with AOL Instant Messenger’s Buddy
List.41 Days before making the motion to the court for alternate
service, the plaintiff sent an e-mail to Mr. Nelson requesting
his physical address. Although Mr. Nelson did not reply, the
37. Snyder v. Alternate Energy Inc., 857 N.Y.S.2d 442, 443-44 (Civ. Ct.
2008); cf. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5) (McKinney 2016) (governing personal
service); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 311 (McKinney 2016) (governing service upon
corporations); N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 311(b) (McKinney 2016) (stating that where
service is “impracticable,” service may be made as directed by the court upon
motion without notice).
38. Snyder, 857 N.Y.S.2d at 444.
39. Id. at 445.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 447.
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plaintiff received a receipt from AOL indicating that the e-mail
had been read.42
After
determining
that
statutory
service
was
impracticable, the court focused on the constitutional due
process requirements of service and the realities of e-mail as a
communication tool. The question was, can e-mail be
reasonably calculated to give a defendant notice of a pending
lawsuit?43 The court compared e-mail to three traditional
alternative methods of service: publication of a summons in a
newspaper, service upon a defendant’s family member or
attorney, and service by mail to the last known address.44 Like
these methods, there is no guarantee that the intended person
will actually receive the message – service by publication is
almost certain not to be seen and postal mail is never assured
to make it into the hands of the intended recipient.45 However,
Mr. Nelson’s conduct demonstrated that he could be reached
via e-mail. His regular on-line presence and his previous e-mail
communications made it reasonable that Mr. Nelson would
receive notice of the pending action if sent via e-mail.46
Snyder’s court-ordered cocktail of communications were
adequate to quell concerns that an e-mail would be ignored,
deleted, or caught in a spam filter. Court-ordered service
included two e-mails with prominent subject lines, paper notice
mailed to the defendant’s last known Connecticut and New
York addresses, and a phone call to Mr. Nelson’s cell phone
informing him that a summons had been sent by e-mail and
regular mail.47 The court reinforced e-mailed service with
other actions likely to attract the defendants’ attention.
C.

Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L.

In a trust case decided on contract theory, Alfred E. Mann
Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L. the court found that a
person may contract away their right to statutory notice in
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 445.
Id.
Id. at 447.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 445, 449.
Id.
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favor of legal notice via e-mail.48
Defendant, Roland Pieper a resident of the Netherlands,
had signed as a personal guarantor to cover ETIRC’s
obligations.49 When a suit ensued, Mr. Pieper objected to
service upon him because it was e-mailed to him.50 Mr. Pieper
had expressly waived all formal service for any actions that
might arise out of the guaranty and had consented to receive
such service by the same method as he received
communications regarding the trust – by e-mail. 51
Because the guaranty required Mr. Pieper to provide two
e-mail addresses at which to receive all communications
regarding the trust,52 the court found that “service of process at
these addresses is, by definition ‘reasonably calculated’ to
apprise Mr. Pieper of the action and thus comports with the
requirements of due process.”53
Here, e-mail is treated no differently than waiving your
right to personal service in favor of mailed service. It was
known that the defendant’s e-mail address was actually used
because this was his official means of communication under
this contract. Conceptually, allowing e-mail for service is little
different than courts around the country utilizing e-filing
where litigants agree in advance to accept court
communications via e-mail.54 In Alfred E. Manning Trust the
defendant had similarly agreed in advance to accept
communications via e-mail.

48. Alfred E. Mann Living Trust v. ETIRC Aviation S.A.R.L., 910
N.Y.S.2d 418 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2010).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 420.
51. Id. at 421.
52. Id. at 420.
53. Id. at 423.
54. Attorneys and pro se litigants register for the website, provide an email address as a necessary means of contact and agree that this e-mail
address is the primary means of communication for the case. See N.Y.S.
UNIFIED
CT.
SYS.,
Filing
by
Electronic
Means,
https://www.nycourts.gov/COURTS/nyscourtofclaims/efilinginstructions.shtml.
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III. How to Utilize C.P.L.R. § 308(5) to Authorize Service of
Process by E-Mail
A.

Step 1: Make an Ex Parte Motion

C.P.L.R. § 308(5) requires the party that is requesting
alternate service from the court to make an ex parte motion.55
Otherwise, service may be incomplete even where the
defendant actually did receive the summons.
In Badenhop v. Badenhop, a divorce action, the movant
improperly requested alternate service with an order to show
cause.56 The court stated that alternate service is to be
requested by motion “and determined ex parte upon affidavits
which establish that service is impracticable under
subdivisions 1, 2, and 4 of that section.”57 In DeCarvalhosa v.
Adler, an action to recover rent, the plaintiff served defendant
at his mother’s house instead of at his residence.58 The
Supreme Court erroneously approved this service upon the
plaintiff’s cross motion deeming service sufficient under
C.P.L.R. § 308(5) nunc pro tunc.59 The Appellate Court
reversed the Supreme Court’s decision because C.P.L.R. §
308(5) requires “that court-ordered” service be authorized only
“upon motion without notice” even though the Appellate Court
agreed that the statutory methods of service were
impracticable under the circumstances.60 In Abshier v. Sunset
Recordings, the plaintiff attempted service a total of seven
times including once by e-mail. The judge denied such
alternate service because the plaintiff failed to first make an ex
parte motion. The plaintiff only asked for such an order as
part of her response to defendant’s motion to dismiss.61

55. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5) (McKinney 2016).
56. Badenhop v. Badenhop, 444 N.Y.S.2d 112, 772 (App. Div. 2d Dept.
1981).
57. Id.
58. DeCarvalhosa v. Adler, 748 N.Y.S.2d 755 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 2002).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 756.
61. Abshier v. Sunset Recordings, Inc., No. 14 Civ. 3227 (CM) (SN), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119742, at *17 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014).
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B. Step 2: Show that Service under All Other Methods is
Impracticable
1. The Meaning of Impracticable
The meaning of “impracticable” in the context of § 308(5)
depends on the facts and circumstances surrounding each case.
It is a situation where service under any other method would
be futile.62 The purpose is to cure the unpredictable
circumstances in which the plaintiff cannot adhere to the
prescribed methods so the court is given discretion to fashion
other means adapted to the particular facts of the case.63 The
statute’s legislative history is helpful in understanding this

62. Liebeskind v. Liebeskind, 449 N.Y.S.2d 226, 228 (App. Div. 1982). In
Liebeskind, a divorce case in which the defendant-wife fled to avoid service,
the court properly ordered expedient service per C.P.L.R. § 308(5). The
plaintiff was not required to show that previous attempts at service were
made. The court’s opinion offers a robust explanation of impracticability:
Simply because Special Term did not require plaintiff to
demonstrate that prior attempts at service were undertaken
is not error. Subdivision 5 requires no such prior attempts.
All that need be shown is that other means of service are
impracticable. This the plaintiff did. Nor was plaintiff
required to demonstrate due diligence before resorting to
service pursuant to subdivision 5. The only limitation
contained in subdivision 5 is the requirement of
impracticability of the other forms of service. In our opinion,
the standard to determine compliance therewith is
somewhat less than the “due diligence” as required by
subdivision 4. Support for this conclusion can be found in
C.P.L.R. 306(c), which requires that where service under
subdivision 4 is undertaken, the particulars as to the
attempted service under subdivisions 1, 2 or 3 must be
detailed. In other words, due diligence must be proven by a
showing of specific instances of attempted service. However,
no such requirement exists for service under subdivision 5.
Here the Court in issuing the ex parte order did fulfill all
obligations imposed upon it.
Id. at 228-29.
63. Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d 451, 455 (N.Y. 1968).
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purpose.64
Alternate service has no antecedent in the Civil Practice
Act.65 Committee comments state “that a primary aim of the
revision was ‘[t]o make it possible, with very limited
exceptions, for a litigant in the New York courts to take full
advantage of the state’s constitutional power over persons and
things.’”66 The only limit to the court’s power, is its
imagination, the facts, and the impracticability standard.67
With alternate service as a tool, New York litigants are much
more likely to receive notice and justice can find those who
seek to dodge service.
2. A Showing of Impracticability Requires Less than a
Showing of Due Diligence
For the court to order service of process under C.P.L.R.§
308(5), the movant must show that service under all other
statutory methods is futile and thus impracticable. This of
course, depends on the facts and circumstances of each case.68
Impracticable must not be confused with the more stringent
standard of due diligence.69
Impracticability does not require a showing that actual
64. It should be noted that earlier versions of the statute require service
to be impracticable under “subdivisions 1, 2, or 4” and later versions require
“subdivisions 1, 2, and 4” (emphasis added). This does not appear to change
the analysis when showing impracticability. Additionally, note that cases
before 1972 refer to alternate service as section four, because at that time the
legislature added what is present-day section three, thus bumping alternate
service down to section five of C.P.L.R. § 308. Id. at 456.
65. This is the predecessor to the Civil Practice Law and Rules
(C.P.L.R.).
Zimmerman’s
Research
Guide,
https://law.lexisnexis.com/infopro/zimmermans/disp.aspx?z=1291.
66. Id. (citing SECOND PRELIMINARY REP. OF THE ADVISORY COMM. ON
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, N.Y. LEGIS.DOC., 1958, No. 13, at 37).
67. Id. at 498.
68. Simens v. Sedrish, 440 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1981).
69. Kelly v. Lewis, 632 N.Y.S.2d 186, 186 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1995).
David D. Siegel described impracticability as showing due diligence used with
§ 308 subdivisions 1 and 2 plus the additional showing that service under
subdivision 4 will not work either. Coyne v. Coyne, 443 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473
(App. Div. 4th Dept. 1981) (quoting David D. Siegel, New York Practice 81).
There is no need to perform a statutory act of service if it would be futile and
thus impracticable. Id.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol36/iss3/7

14

1012

PACE LAW REVIEW

Vol. 36:3

prior attempts to serve a party under each and every statutory
method have been pursued.70 In Salesi v. Nieves, a wrongful
death action, alternate service was granted where there was no
need to show “prior attempts at service upon defendant, nor
was ‘due diligence on the part of the plaintiff required.”71
Plaintiff was permitted to mail service to the defendant’s last
known address and to his liability insurance company.72 In
Saulo v. Noumi, a medical malpractice action, the plaintiff
successfully met the impracticability requirement by
submitting affidavits from her attorney, the injured party, and
the process service. The affidavits “detailed the repeated
attempts to personally serve the individual defendant and the
inability of the plaintiffs to determine his whereabouts despite
substantial inquiry.”73 Although the defendant was never
actually served, these affidavits showed plaintiff’s inability to
effect service despite her substantial inquiry and repeated
attempts.74
In Tremont Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Ndanusa, an action
to foreclose on a mortgage, the court held that prior attempts at
service need not be shown to find impracticability. Here,
alternate service via publication was deemed proper despite
the defendant’s allegations that the process server had lied
when he said service had been attempted on numerous
occasions.75
In Deason v. Deason, a divorce action, the only two
prescribed methods of service,76 personal and publication, were
deemed impracticable even though publication was never
attempted.77 The Appellate Division upheld service via e-mail
70. Tremont Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Ndanusa, 535 N.Y.S.2d 8, 9 (App.
Div. 2d Dept. 1988); see also, Hitchcock v. Pyramid Ctrs. of Empire State Co.,
542 N.Y.S.2d 813, 814 (App. Div. 3d Dept. 1989); Coyne, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
71. Salesi v. Nieves, 461 N.Y.S.2d 361, 361 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1983).
72. Id.
73. Saulo v. Noumi, 501 N.Y.S.2d 95, 96-7 (App. Div. 2d Dept. 1986).
74. Id.
75. Tremont, 535 N.Y.S.2d at 9.
76. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 refers to N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 232, which
precludes the use of substituted service under § 308 subdivisions 2, 3, and 4
in matrimonial actions.
77. Deason v. Deason, 343 N.Y.S.2d 276 (Sup. Ct. 1973). A year prior to
the present case, Deason went before the Court of Appeals, which ruled that
the local government must bear the cost of service via publication for indigent
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per C.P.L.R. § 308(5) because the court found service by
publication was a burden on the county taxpayers where the
wife proceeded as an indigent plaintiff and the defendant could
not be located to effect personal service.78
A plaintiff seeking to effect alternate service must make a
showing that the other prescribed methods of service could not
be made.79 This is often in the form of affidavits from
attorneys, plaintiffs, and process servers. In Simens v. Sedrish,
the plaintiff assumed she would have difficulty serving the
defendant because her predecessor in interest had difficulty in
effecting service. The plaintiff served the defendant via e-mail
then made an application to the court for an order authorizing
such service, nunc pro tunc. The application was denied
because nothing in the record “indicated what steps, if any,
plaintiff had initiated on her own behalf to effect service
pursuant to the prescribed methods, and why those methods
proved impracticable.”80 Thus, without sufficient evidence, a
motion for alternate service will be denied.81 Impracticability
requires a factual showing that may be presented with
affidavits, receipts, search records, and cost analysis that

plaintiffs so as not to deny access to the courts in violation of the 14th
Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Deason v. Deason, 296 N.E.2d 229, 230
(N.Y. 1973). To reduce the cost to the local government, and because service
pursuant to N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5) may only be granted upon a motion, the
New York Court of Appeals invited the parties to apply for a determination if
judicially devised service under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308(5) is permissible instead
of service by publication. Id.
78. Deason, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 278-79. Plaintiff and the county joined in
an ex parte motion requesting to serve defendant by mailing the summons to
the homes of defendant’s mother and his sister. Id. The court granted the
motion, finding that although not every single method of service was
attempted, plaintiff had exhausted all other reasonable possibilities of
statutory service, noting that N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 308 and N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §
232 preclude the use of substituted service under subdivisions 2, 3, and 4 in
matrimonial actions.
79. Simens v. Sedrish, 440 N.Y.S.2d 687, 688 (App. Div. 2nd Dept. 1981);
see Coyne v. Coyne, 443 N.Y.S.2d 472, 473 (App. Div. 4th Dept. 1981) (“[A]
factual foundation precisely specifying time, when, place where and methods
used to satisfy the service requirements must be spelled out from supporting
affidavits of those with first-hand knowledge. A showing that is merely
inconvenient . . . is not sufficient to meet the statutory test of
‘impracticable.’”).
80. Simens, 440 N.Y.S.2d at 688.
81. Coyne, 443 N.Y.S.2d at 472.
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service by the other prescribed methods is futile.
C. Step 3: Demonstrate that Service Is Reasonably Calculated
to Provide Notice
In order to protect a defendant’s 14th Amendment right of
due process, service of process must provide notice reasonably
calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
opportunity to present their objections.82
Because there is no precise test for this constitutional
requirement,83 courts scrutinize the facts of each situation to
determine if the prescribed method of service will reasonably
provide a defendant notice of the litigation. In Phillip Morris
USA Inc. v. Veles, Ltd., the defendant’s business appeared to be
conducted entirely through electronic communications because
it only operated online stores and no physical addresses were
posted on its websites.84 Similarly, in Chanel, Inc. v. Zhixian,
the defendant operated an entirely online business without
disclosing its physical location.85 In each case the plaintiffs
showed that service by e-mail was likely to reach the
defendants. In Phillip Morris, the “plaintiff had amply
demonstrated the high likelihood that the defendants would
receive and respond to e-mail communications” by showing that
the defendants conducted their business extensively through
their website and that they regularly correspond with
customers via e-mail. 86 In Chanel, Inc., the court found that emails had presumptively reached the defendant because
numerous e-mails sent to an e-mail address provided by
defendant had not bounced back.87
Showing a course of conduct that parties communicated via

82. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314
(1950); Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940).
83. Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.
84. Philip Morris USA Inc. v. Veles Ltd., No. 06 CV 2988 GBD, 2007 WL
725412, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2007).
85. Chanel, Inc. v. Zhixian, No. 10-CV-60585, 2010 WL 1740695, at *1
(S.D. Fla. Apr. 29, 2010).
86. Philip Morris, No. 06 CV 2988 GBD, 2007 WL 725412, at *3.
87. Chanel, Inc., 10-CV-60585, 2010 WL 1740695, at *3.
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e-mail supports a finding that e-mail service is reasonably
calculated to notify a defendant of an action against her. In
Safadjou v. Mohammadi, a divorce case, the record showed
that the parties had been communicating via e-mail for several
months through the e-mail addresses that were on record.88
Additionally, the defendant acknowledged receiving e-mails
from the plaintiff’s attorney which were sent to the same e-mail
address.89
IV. Service by E-Mail is a Valuable Tool for New York Courts
Although service of process by e-mail is increasingly
authorized by the courts under C.P.L.R. § 308(5), this type of
service still raises concerns. E-mail is treated as a casual form
of communication. There is no guarantee that an e-mail will
reach its intended recipient. Spam filters may sweep it away, it
may be deleted, or be merely overlooked in a crowded inbox.
Unlike a signed postal receipt, there is no affirmative
acknowledgement by the intended recipient that the message
was received. A return receipt will be initiated by any person
who happens to open the e-mail.
Courts recognize these afflictions and generally refuse to
allow such excuses. Similarly, courts discourage the lazy
plaintiff by requiring a finding that service by statutory means
is impracticable. The constitutional requirement of “reasonably
calculated to provide notice” permits courts to do everything in
their power to reach defendants. Such practices include followups via telephone, text message, publication, and postal mail.
In their exercises of judicial discretion, courts thus far have not
relied solely on e-mail service so that neither the oblivious
defendant nor the nefarious defendant can avoid justice.
However, e-mail should not be treated as a primary means
of notice. The facts of how people use e-mail create too great a
risk. People frequently e-mail the wrong recipient and some email accounts are only reluctantly used. Those seeking to evade
service can apply filters and block senders or they can change

88. Safadjou v. Mohammadi, 964 N.Y.S.2d 801, 803-04 (App. Div. 4th
Dept. 2013).
89. Id.
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e-mail addresses every few weeks. The drafters of the C.P.L.R.
contemplated that service will occasionally fail to actually
notify defendant.90 This hazard comes with all methods of
service, not just e-mail. The C.P.L.R. provides a remedy by
allowing a person “to defend [an] action within one year” after
she knows a final judgment is against her.91 In this way, an
oblivious defendant may still be heard even after a final
judgment. The risks of adding e-mail into our regular tool box
for notice are adequately addressed within the C.P.L.R.
Service via e-mail is gaining traction as an appropriate method
of alternate service.
The benefits of e-mailed service far outweigh the risks so
long as the court continues to direct other safeguards to
maximize notice to the defendant. With adherence to C.P.L.R. §
308(5)’s three-part test, e-mail will continue to provide a
valuable and efficient service to New York’s justice system.
“< < < < < < < < < < < <Message Deleted> > > > > > > > > > >”

90. Dobkin v. Chapman, 236 N.E.2d, 451 (N.Y. 1968) (discussing N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 317).
91. Id. (citing N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 317).
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